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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2000, scientists involved in the Human Genome Project' announced
* J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington 2001; B.S. Biology, Indiana
University, 1998.
1. The Human Genome Project ("HGP") is a "collection of ... coordinated projects," with
the ultimate goal of mapping the entire human genome. JOELDAviS, MAPPING THE CODE: THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE CHOICES OF MODERN SCIENCE 3-4 (1990). The National
Institutes of Health ('NIH") and the Department of Energy ("DOE") lead U.S. efforts, with
private sector corporations (for example, Celera Genomics Corp.) making additional
contributions. HGP is an international effort, with contributions from partners in England,
Germany, and Japan, among others. Andre C. Frieden, Regulating GeneData,NAT'LL.J.,Mar.
27, 2000, at Cl.
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their success in mapping the human genome. This is the latest step in an ongoing
debate: should people be granted a property interest in living material? More
specifically, may human genes and tissues be patented? The National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") created a stir in 1991 when it filed numerous patent applications for
gene sequences identified through its work on the Human Genome Project. Although
the NIH later withdrew the patents,4 the controversy over property rights in human
tissues remains. With advances in biotechnology and the advent of cloning, it seems
likely these issues will continue to cause controversy for many years to come.
The resolution of these issues will impact developing brgan replacement
technologies. As the shortage of organs available for transplantation continues to
grow,6 new methods of obtaining organs and tissues are being developed. These
technologies raise several issues, including the extent of the property interest people
have in their own tissues and the implications of the potential patenting of cloned
organs and transgenic animals. This Note examines various organ procurement
methods, discusses conflicting property interests these methods raise, and proposes
a solution to the competing interests of potentially interested parties. Part II looks at
potential sources for organs and tissues needed for transplantation, including the
feasibility of cloning organs, cloning humans to be organ donors, and the use of
animal organs and xenotransplantation issues. Part HI addresses various property
rights associated with the organ and tissue sources discussed in Part H, including both
traditional property law and possible patent protection. Part IV concludes that a
person should have a property interest in cloned organs. Such an interest should
extend to organs cloned in a laboratory, but not to the organs of a human clone or to
research innovations obtained through the use of donor DNA.
2. Richard J. Berman, Gene Sequences, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4,2000, at B7. A genome is "all
the genetic material in the chromosomes of a particular organism or species." DAVIS, supra
note 1, at 284. Chromosomes are made of DNA, and contain genes separated by long segments
of "junk DNA." See PHmup KrrcHEP,, THE LIVES TO COME 29-49 (1996).
3. See LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE 184-91 (1999).
4. The NIH failed "to demonstrate novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness."Animal and
Gene Patent Moratorium Bill Is Reintroduced, BUREAU OFNAT'L AFF. PAT., TRADE MARK &
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Mar. 9, 1993, available at LEXIS, News Library, BNA Pat. File.
Although the NIH withdrew its patent applications, other organizations have been granted such
patents. PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 248-49
(Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1999).
5. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721
(1990). For a discussion of some of the concerns arising from the HGP, see Mary Z. Pelias &
Nathan J. Markward, The Human Genome Project and Public Perception: Truth and
Consequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 837 (2000).
6. Danielle M. Wagner, Comment, Property Rights in the Human Body: The
Commercialization of Organ Transplantation and Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 943
(1995); see also Tim Bonfield, Despite New Effort, Organ Giving Down Again, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Feb. 9,2000, at BI. For a history of organ donation in the United States, see RENtE




H. POTENTIAL SOURCES FOR ORGANS AND TISSUES
This Part addresses the feasibility ofusing cloning technology as apotential source
of transplantable organs. The need for a readily available source of tr4nsplantable
organs and tissues becomes greater each year. Even though the number of organ
transplants increases every year, so does the number of people waiting for a
compatible organ.7 Because of consent requirements8 and compatibility problems,9
traditional sources of transplantable organs such as cadaveric organ donation are
inadequate to meet the growing demand. ° Consequently, scientists have begun to
look to alternative sources for transplantable organs, one of the most promising
sources being cloned organs.
A. Cloned Organs: A Feasible Option?
One of the most beneficial potential uses of the new cloning technology is the
possi'bility of cloning to obtain tissues for transplants." Before the arrival of Dolly,'2
the prospect of successfully cloning humans seemed closer to science fiction than
reality. However, when Dr. Ian Wilmut and his colleagues at the Roslin Institute in
Scotland presented Dolly to the world, a whole new realm of possible medical uses
for cloning technology emerged. This development sparked a debate among scientists,
politicians, and scholars about the moral and ethical implications of exploiting the
new technology to create human clones.'3 Despite the potential benefits of cloning
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES: 2000, 130 tbl.
201 (120th ed. 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec03.pdf.
8. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
10. Peter A. Libel et al., Pennsylvania's Voluntary Benefits Program: Evaluating an
Innovative Proposal for Increasing Organ Donation, in 19 HEALTH AFF. 206, 206 (2000).
Rates ofcadaveric organ donation in the United States remain low, with only half of all eligible
donors actually donating organs. Id.
11. In addition to the various ways cloning can be used to obtain tissues for transplants,
see infra, cloning also has important implications for infertility, medical research, livestock
production, and production of pharmaceuticals. See Ethics of Human Cloning: Testimony on
Ethics and Theology: A Continuation of the National Discussion on Human Cloning Before
the Subcommittee on Public Health and Safety Committee on Labor and Human Resources
(June 17, 1997) (statement of John A. Robertson, J.D., Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law,
University of Texas School of Law), available at 1997 WL 329510 (F.D.C.H.) (infertility);
see also 143 CONG. REC. E607 (Apr. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep. Lee H. Hamilton) (medical
research, agriculture, pharmaceuticals).
12. Dolly was the first animal cloned using DNA from a fully differentiated adult cell.
Scientists used DNA from an udder cell from a female ewe to create her. As ajoke, she was
named after Dolly Parton. GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, AND THE PATH AHEAD
3 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Daniel R. Heimbach, Cloning Humans: Dangerous, Unjustifiable, and
Genuinely Immoral, 32 VAL U. L. REV. 633 (1998); Erin M. Stepno, Successful 4nimal
CloningRaises QuestionsAbout Human CloningPossibilities: Science Fiction No Longer, 29
2002]
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organs and the controversy surrounding this issue, there is still much work to be done
before cloned organs are a reality.
1. Methods of Cloning
Cloning in its simplest sense "refers to a precise genetic copy of a molecule, cell,
plant, animal, or human being."'14 There are, however, four separate ways to clone. 5
The first two methods, molecular and cellular cloning, cannot be used to produce a
cloned human.'6 The simplest of the four processes, molecular cloning involves
copying and amplifying DNA gene fragments in a host cell to produce large
quantities of the DNA for use in experiments.'7 As its name indicates, cellular cloning
occurs at the cellular level, by growing cells in culture in a laboratory to produce a
cell line.' 8
The two remaining methods of cloning, blastomere separation and somatic nuclear
transplantation cloning ("SNTC"), are capable of producing a cloned human."
Blastomere separation involves splitting an embryo soon after fertilization (while it
is in the two-to-eight cell stage).20 Each resulting cell is capable of producing an
entire organism, genetically identical to the others.2'
Like blastomere separation, SNTC is capable of producing a cloned human."
SNTC, the technique thatproduced Dolly, was an importantbreakthrough for cloning
MCGEORGE L. REv. 666, 669-72 (1998); Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee?,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at 52; Ruth Macklin, Human Cloning? Don't Just Say No, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 64. President Clinton commissioned the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC") to examine ethical and legal issues raised by the
prospect of human cloning. Exec. Order No. 12975, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1995). The NBAC
concluded that at the time it was morally unacceptable for anyone to attempt to create a child
using the techniques used to create Dolly. The NBAC based its finding partly on safety reasons
(Dolly was the only success out of 277 attempts), among others, concluding that the techniques
"are likely to involve unacceptable risks to the fetus and/or potential child." NAT'LBIOETHiCS
ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
NATIONALBIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 65,108 (1997) [hereinafterNBAC REPORT]; see
also Craig M. Klugman & Thomas H. Murray, Cloning, Historical Ethics, and NBAC, in
HUMAN CLONING 37-42 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1998) [hereinafter
HUMAN CLONING] (discussing ethical considerations of the NBAC report); Cloning Human
Beings: Respondingto the NationalBioethicsAdvisory Commission 'sReport, 27(5) HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 6-22 (1997) (critiquing the conclusions of the NBAC).
14. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 13; see also HUMAN CLONING, supra note 13, at 6-
8.
15. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 14-15.
16. Id. at 14.
17. This technique is important for recombinant DNA technology. Id.
18. This technique is also useful in the production of new medicines. Id.
19. Id. at 15-16.
20.Id. at 15.
21. This is similar to the process that results in identical twins.
22. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16.
[Vol. 77:363
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technology. In SNTC, the nucleus is removed from an egg cell and replaced with the
nucleus from a somatic cell.' Prior to Dolly, scientists did not believe it was possible
to clone using DNA from adult animals; these scientists believed that cell
differentiation was irreversible.24 However, Dr. Wilmut and his colleagues overcame
this problem using a starvation technique.' By starving adult cells of nutrients, the
cells become inactive.' Once the cells are inactivated, scientists can introduce the
DNA from a differentiated cell, and essentially reprogram the DNA to express all its
genes.27 The resulting cell is capable of producing an animal genetically identical to
the DNA donor.'
2. Human Clones as Organ Donors
Despite proposed legislation aimed at banning the cloning of human beings, the
prospect of cloning raises interesting possibilities for the field of organ
transplantation. The current shortage of organs available for transplantation 0 is due
in large part to the problems involved in finding a suitable donor. The biggest reason
transplants fail is rejection of the transplanted organ' The closer the match between
23. Id. at 15. This differs from blastomere separation in that it can produce a clone from
an adult animal-a twin separated in time. Blastomere separation, because it involves the
splitting of embryos rather than the incorporation of DNA from a single individual, cannot
produce a clone of a preexisting person. Id.
24. Id. at 16. Differentiation is the process through which certain portions of DNA are
"turned off." KrrCHER, supra note 2, at 328. When this occurs, it allows the cell to become part
of different tissues in the body. Id.
25. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 22.
26. Id.
27. This technique coordinated the cell cycles of the egg and donor cells. Id.
28. Although the nuclear DNA of clones produced using this technique is identical to that
ofthe donor, there are some cellular differences. Cells contain organelles called mitochondria,
which are found in the cytoplasm of cells, and contain some of their own genes. Id. at 18. Since
only the nuclear DNA is transferred using this technique, the clone will retain the mitochondria
present in the recipient egg cell. Id. Consequently, while genetically identical to the DNA
donor, the clone is not an exact duplicate. Id. For a briefhistory of cloning, see KITCHER, supra
note 2, at 328-30; Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The Constitutionality of a
Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KY. L.J. 277, 289-301 (1998-1999).
29. See, e.g., CLONING PROHIBITON ACT OF 2001, H.R. 2172, 107th Cong. (2001);
HUMAN CLONING RESEARCH PROHIBITION ACT, H.R. 1372, 107th Cong. (2001) (restricting
federal funding for research utilizing SNTC technology); CLONING PROHIBrION ACT OF 1997,
H.R. Doc. No. 105-97 (1997); Lawton, supra note 28, at 301-12. While these bills generally
ban the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to initiate a pregnancy, use of SNTC to
clone molecules or DNA, or to use in gene therapy, in vitro fertilization, or animal cloning is
generally not prohibited. The bills also provide penalties of up to ten years imprisonment or
fines of up to one to ten million dollars for violations.
30. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7.
31. GEORGE W. MILLER, MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 71 (1971). Rejection occurswhen therecipient's immune system recognizes the
2002)
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the tissue of the donor and the tissue of the recipient, the better the chances are for
success.32 Consequently, identical twins are ideal donors. There is no risk ofrejection
because the donor and recipient tissues are an exact match.33
One proposed source of compatible organs is cloned human beings. A clone of a
candidate for an organ transplant would, like an identical twin, be a perfect tissue
match. There would be no risk ofrejection because the clone would contain the same
genetic material as the organ recipient; the clone would essentially be a younger
version of the recipient. Cloning for this reason would obviously be extremely
beneficial. As former ethicist for the NIH, John Fletcher, commented, "'[t]he reasons
for opposing this are not easy to argue."'34
Even so, several commentators have raised objections to cloning for this purpose,
most having to deal with the well-being of the cloned individual.35 Concerns are
largely based on the theory of personhood. Cloning a person for spare parts would
"violate the clone's individual autonomy and liberty."'36 Creation for this purpose
would be both psychologically and physically an abuse of power.37 Cloning a human
for use as a source of organs may also implicate the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition on property interests in human beings.3
transplanted organ as a foreign entity and attacks it. This can be regulated somewhat with




34. Jeffrey Kluger, Will We Follow the Sheep? It Will Be Up to Science to Determine if
Human Cloning Can Be Done. It Is Up to the Rest of Us to Determine ifit Should Be, TIME,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 66 (quoting John Fletcher). Indeed, cloning for this purpose would be
comparable to parents of an ill child who have another child in the hopes the new child will be
a compatible organ donor. See id. In both cases a new person is created with the hope he or she
will be a compatible organ donor.
35. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 668 (1998); see also Kimberly M. Jackson,
Well, Hello Dolly! The Advent of Cloning Legislation and Its Constitutional Implications, 52
SMU L. REv. 283, 298 (1999); Shannon H. Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on
Human Cloning Is Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 326-28 (1999).
36. Jackson, supra note 35, at 298.
37. Andrews, supra note 35, at 669 (quoting Francis C. Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction
and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S.
CAL L. REv. 476,492 (1974)).
38. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States..
." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, § 1. A fully functioning clone would be a person, and therefore
presumably subject to the same rights and privileges afforded other citizens by the Constitution.
In addition, protection against state mandated cloning may arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment's incorporation doctrine. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
[Vol. 77:363
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In addition to the lack of consensus on the morality of cloning in general, there is
still much disagreement over the legitimacy of cloning to save lives.39 However, even
if there was greater support for human cloning in general, the existence of a clone
would not necessarily guarantee the availability of organs and tissues for
transplantation. A clone would presumably be a person in his or her own right, not
an object from which to pick and choose organs. Consequently, the laws that
currently govern organ donation would apply to clone donation as well.4 ° It would be
up to the clone to decide whether or not to donate organs, not the DNA donor.
Another suggested use of human clones as organ donors arose in 1997. Not long
after the birth of Dolly, a group of British scientists announced that they had created
a headless frog embryo named Freddy."' This announcement brought with it
speculation that scientists may be able to apply the same technology used to create
headless frogs to human embryos,4" in effect creating headless human clones for the
purpose of increasing the supply of organs and tissues available for transplantation.
Although it may sound ghoulish, the creation of brain-dead human clones as a
source of organs may have certain advantages over fully functioning clones. For
example, creation of brain dead human clones may bypass some of the donation
consent problems present with cloning functional humans for organs. Under the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"),43 a donor must be dead before a physician
may harvest his or her organs." Death is traditionally defined as "the irreversible
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
39. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 30. For a discussion of the pros and cons of cloning,
see Michael Tooley, The Moral Status of the Cloning ofHumans, in HUMAN CLONING, supra
note 13, at 85-98.
40. See Smith, supra note 35, at 325 n.63.
41. Roger Hannah, How a Headless Frog Could Help Us Grow Human Hearts, SCOT.
DAILY REc. & SUN. MAIL LTD., Oct. 20, 1997, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, Record File.
Scientists created the headless frogs by using gene-modification techniques to damage the gene
that codes for the development of a head, and then inserting this modified DNA into the
nucleus of a frog egg. Human Cloning and the Headless Frog Experiment, Hous. CHRON.,
Nov. 13, 1997, at 6, LEXIS, News Library, Hchrn File. [hereinafter Headless Frog
Experiment].
42. British Tinkering with Tadpoles Opens Way to Headless Humans, AGENCE FRANCE
PREsSE, Oct. 19, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. In addition to using this technique to
create headless human clones, it is speculated that the same method may eventually allow
scientists to grow a human organ in a womb-like sac. Headless Frog Experiment, supra note
41.
43. For a discussion of organ donation under the 1987 UAGA, see Robert E. Sullivan, The
Uniform.Anatomical GiftAct, in ORGAN ANDTISSUE DONATION: ETFCAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY
ISSUEs 24-33 (Bethany Spielman ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter ORGAN AND TISSUE
DONATION].
44. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 4 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 2001).
2002]
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cessation of all vital functions, including respiration, circulation, and heartbeat." '45
However, some courts define "death" for the purposes of the UAGA as including
neurological or brain death.4 Since the clone may meet this definition of death, the
right to consent to donation would pass to the next of kin. In this way, transplant
patients avoid consent problems.' This is to say nothing, however, of the moral and
ethical problems associated with creating clones of this type. Many people find
repugnant the very idea of creating a headless or brain dead clone for the purpose of
harvesting organs.' At present, this moral barrier makes this option unrealistic.
However, the morals of society change,49 and it is possible to envision a time when
the idea of creating such body clones would be less repugnant to society as a whole,
making this a more attractive and feasible option.
3. Cloning Individual Organs
The same technology used to create headless frog embryos may also one day lead
to the growth of individual human organs and tissues in the laboratory. Some
scientists believe that "the technique could be adapted to grow human organs such as
hearts, kidneys, livers and pancreases in an embryonic sac living in an artificial
womb."' The progression of technology to this level could be the most beneficial and
least objectionable of the three forms of human cloning previously discussed. Cloning
individual organs would overcome the organ shortage and rejection problems,5' as
well as avoid some of the moral and ethical concerns surrounding human
reproductive cloning.
45. Thomas R. Trenker, Tests ofDeath for Organ TransplantPurposes, 76 A.L.R.3d 913,
914 (1977).
46. See New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687-88
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). The hypothesized brain-dead clone scenario is comparable to the plight
of anencephalic infants (children born typically with only a brain stem, but lacking a brain and
skull). Smith, supra note 35, at 329 n.75. For a discussion on the pros and cons of organ
donation by anencephalic infants, see Joseph N. Harden, The "Gift" of Life: Should
Anencephalic Infants Die to Serve Noble Goals?, 27 CuMB. L. REV. 1279 (1996-1997).
47. See infra notes 114-17.
48. See Stephen Breen, Human Clones 'Will Be Used as Organ Factories,' SCOTSMAN,
Oct. 20, 1997, at 5.
49. One of the most notable examples of this is the morality requirement for patents. In
the past, courts rejected patents on things deemed immoral, such as gambling machines, on the
grounds that they lacked moral utility. In recent years, society has shown a greater acceptance
of gambling, and courts no longer reject such patents on morality grounds. For a general debate
on patents and the morality issue, see Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Law and Policy Symposium: Re-
Engineering Patent Law: The Challenge ofNew Technologies, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247
(2000).
50. Breen, supra note 48, at 5.
51. Since scientists would clone the organs using the transplant recipient's cells, the
cloned organs would be a perfect match, thus negating the need for immunosuppressive drugs.
Steve Connor & Deborah Cadbury, Headless Frog Opens Way for Human Organ Factory,
SUNDAY TMEs (LoNDON), Oct. 19, 1997, News at 1.
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Although the ability to clone human organs in a laboratory is still a long way off,
research in the field looks promising. The most likely candidate for organ cloning
thus far is bone marrow. The process would proceed in the same manner as embryo
cloning: fusing cells from the patient with a denucleated egg cell. 2 The egg cell
would reset the genetic clock of the DNA to resemble that of an embryo. Scientists
could then add chemicals to direct the cells to differentiate into the desired tissue, in
this case bone marrow." The resulting tissues would be genetically identical to the
patient's own, and thus carry no risk of rejection. In addition to bone marrow,
scientists may use these techniques to develop other organs, including skin grafts for
burn victims.'
New discoveries about the capabilities of stem cells55 lend further encouragement
to this type of research.' Experiments show that injecting bone marrow stem cells
into rats results in the formation of new liver tissue.' If this technique could be
extrapolated to humans, scientists may one daybe able to use the technology to renew
organs instead of replacing them.
This work with stem cells also has implications for tissue engineering. 8 In tissue
engineering, "human cells are grown in the laboratory and then draped onto a fibrous,
biodegradable scaffolding made in the shape of the desired tissue or organ."'59 The
body's tissues then incorporate the new cells.' Consequently, the ability to clone
stem cells could greatly benefit these developing organ technologies,6 as well as the
52. KOLATA, supra note 12, at 234.
53. Id.
54. J. Madeleine Nash, The Case for Cloning: The Benefits of This fiold Technique
Outweigh the Risks, and the Danger Is Not What You Think, TIME, Feb. 9, 1998, at 81.
55. Stem cells are "primitive, undifferentiated cells from the embryo that are still
totipotent," and are the precursors of all cell lines. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 30.
56. Stem cell research also has implications for the treatment of several chronic human
diseases, such as diabetes and Parkinson's disease.
57. Scientists Discover Cell that Can Grow New Liver Tissue, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
May 14, 1999, at 1 A, available at LEXMS, News Library, Charleston Gazette File. Stem cell
technology may also be useful in treating neurodegenerative diseases. Cloning-Challenges
for Public Policy: TestimonyBefore the Subcommittee on Public Health andSafety Committee
on Labor andHuman Resources (Mar. 12, 1997), available at 1997 WL 136117 (F.D.C.H.)
(testimony of Harold Varmus, M.D., Director, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Dep't of Health and
Human Servs.).
58. Tissue engineering is the "rebuilding or repairing [of] parts of the body using a
combination of artificial materials and living cells." Richard Saltus, Engineered Body Parts to
Renew Injured Organs, THE SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL, Nov. 21, 1999, at 12D, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Chrgaz File.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. President George W. Bush's stated opposition to the use of stem cells from aborted
fetuses for research purposes may somewhat hamper stem cell research. See Maggie Fox, Bush
Signals Opposition to Some Stem Cell Research, at
http://www.netlink.de/gen/Zeitung/2001/010127.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
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field of cell therapy.62
Cloning plays an important role in the development of stem cell research. For
example, some scientists clone human embryos with the intent of harvesting the
embryonic stem cells for transplantation into patients.63 Stem cells obtained from this
method would clearly be beneficial for treatment purposes. Because the stem cells
would be a genetic match for the donor patient, there would be no risk of rejection
which otherwise may occur if stem cells harvested from another embryo were used."
Stem cell research is not without controversy, however. Many people fear that
cloning embryos to harvest stem cells is the first step towards reproductive cloning."
Critics fear this research may lead to a greater success rate in creating healthy clones,
undermining one of the strongest anticloning arguments." Consequently, the
controversy surrounding stem cell research has led to several proposals to limit
federal funding of stem cell research.6' In response, some scientists urge Congress to
distinguish between human reproductive cloning and therapeutic cloning, which is
essential for much stem cell research.68
62. In cell therapy, scientists use fetal cells to revitalize older cells. Cloning would make
numerous cells available for this type of therapy. Khristan A. Heagle, Should There BeAnother
Ewe?A CriticalAnalysis ofthe European Union Cloning Legislation, 17 DICK. J. INT'LL. 135,
151-52 (1998).
63. Rick Weiss, Embryo Work Raises Specter of Human Harvesting: Medical Research
Teams Draw Closer to Cloning, WASH. POST, June 14,1999, at Al. Cloning embryos to obtain
their stem cells for use in treating human diseases is an example of therapeutic cloning. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. There are clear analogies between stem cell research and the abortion issue. For those
who believe life begins at conception, creating embryos for the sole purpose ofdestroying them
for their stem cells is unnecessary and immoral. Prepared Testimony ofRichard M. Doerringer
on Behalf of the Committee for Pro-Life Activities United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops Before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 18, 2001, LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File. There are others who argue that the embryos used in such research are not
technically human life. As the argument goes, human life, as opposed to cellular life, does not
begin until after fourteen days of development (in other words, after the primitive streak has
formed). In preimplantation embryos at the blastocyst stage "no body cells of any type have
formed, and even more significantly, there is strong evidence that not even the earliest of events
in the chain of events in somatic differentiation have been initiated." Prepared Testimony of
Michael D. West, Ph.D., President & CEO, Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., Before the Senate
Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Labor, FED. NEWS SERV. July 18,2001, LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File [hereinafter West]. Therefore, "no individual exists (in otherwords,
the blastocyst may still form identical twins)." Id.
67. See, e.g., Stem Cell Research Act of 2001, S. 723, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2059,
107th Cong. (2001). Under the Stem Cell Research Act of 2001, research on embryos for the
purpose of generating embryonic stem cells may be federally funded only if the embryos used
would otherwise be discarded and were donated with the written informed consent of the
donor. The Act further prohibits the use of such embryos in human reproductive cloning. Id.
68. West, supra note 66; see also Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 and Cloning
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B. Xenotransplantation" and Transgenic Animals
In addition to cloning organs using human cells, cloning technology can be utilized
to increase the success of xenotransplantation. The major advantage of
xenotransplantation, 0 in addition to providing a plentiful supply of transplantable
organs, is that while animals can provide a plentiful supply of transplantable organs,
raising animals for the purpose of harvesting organs raises fewer moral objections
than doing the same in humans. There are disadvantages to xenotransplantation,
however. Aside fromphysiological differences inthe shape and size of animal organs
and the potential for infection with animal diseases, there is "a much more
pronounced rejection response to nonhuman donor tissues"' than is normal for
human-to-human transplants.
72
Currently, two methods are available to prevent rejection. First, doctors attempt to
match donor and recipient tissues as closely as possible.73 This match is difficult
enough to achieve with human-to-human donation,74 but the differences between
species make it an unfeasible option for xenotransplantation. The second method
involves the use of immunosuppressive drugs.7 - Over the years, such drugs have
Prohibition Act of2001: Hearing on H.R. 1644 and H.R. 2172 Before the House Subcomm.
On Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 47-50 (2001)
(prepared testimony of Thomas Okarma, President, Genron Corp.), available at 2001 WL
695384 [hereinafter Okarma]. As its name indicates, in reproductive cloning, scientists clone
embryos with the intention of creating a human or other organism, for example Dolly. Rick
Weiss, U.S. Ruling Aids Opponents ofPatentsfor Life Forms, WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at
A2. Therapeutic cloning, in contrast, involves cloning for the purposes of dedifferentiating a
person's cells and obtaining, for example, embryonic stem cells for use in treating human
diseases. West, supra note 66. Therapeutic cloning has many potential beneficial uses for
regenerative medicines and treating various human diseases.
69. Xenotransplantation is "the transplantation ofviable cells, tissues and organs from one
species to another." ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEv., XENOTRANSPLANTATION:
INTERNATIONAL PoucY ISSUES 9 (1999) [hereinafter XENOTRANSPLANTATION].
70. For a brief history of xenotransplantation, see Jodi K. Frederickson, He's All Heart
... and a Little Pig Too: A Look at the FDA Draft Xen otransplant Guideline, 52 FOOD DRUG
COSM L.J. 429,430-32.
71. Denise Faustman,Xenogenic Transplantation: The Use ofAnimalsfor Organ Donors,
in FETAL RESEARCH AND APPICATIONS: A CONFERENCE SUMMARY 58, 58 (Inst. of Med. ed.,
1994).
72. There are three types of rejection involved in xenografts. With hyperacute rejection
there is an immediate immunological response to the transplanted organ. The recipient's
immune system recognizes proteins on the surface of the organ as foreign, causing the immune
system to attack the organ. XENOTRANSPLANTATION, supra note 69, at 20-21. The two other
types ofrejection, delayed xenograft rejection and chronic rejection, occur over longer periods
of time. The cause of these types of rejection is not fully understood, but the production of
antibodies is a likely factor. Id. at 21-22.
73.Id. at23.
74. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
75. XENOTRANSPLANTATION, supra note 69, at 23.
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worked with varying degrees of success.'
Thus far, out of all animals,, pigs show the greatest promise for successful
xenotransplantation.' Although baboons are more immunologically compatible with
humans, that very compatibility also results in a greater risk of cross-species disease
infection."8 Pigs, on the other hand, make good candidates because many of their
organs are sufficiently similar in size and structure to those of humans, and there is
less risk of cross-species disease infection.79
Cloning and transgenic technology may help increase the chances of successful
xenotransplantation using pigs. Using transgenic technology, pig cells could be
geneticallymodified in the lab oratoryby adding human genes to them.80 The resulting
cells would express human rather than pig proteins and would appear to the
recipient's immune system to be a human organ.8" Cloning these genetically modified
pig cells would result in a ready supply of transplantable organs.' Advances in this
technology may eventually enable transplant recipients to receive organs from pigs
that were cloned using the transplant recipient's own cells, further eliminating the risk
of rejection.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ORGANS AND TiSSUS
The advent of cloning and related technologies also raises questions about who
should have a property interest in the resulting products. In other words, who should
control the use of the cloned organ? Courts already recognize a property interest in
living material." Several different parties may potentially claim cloned organs or
tissues: the DNA/tissue donor, the clone, and the scientist who developed the cloned
tissue/organ or transgenic animal. This section addresses issues surrounding the
ownership and control of cloned organs by examining both traditional property law
and patent law.
A. A Brief Overview of Law Governing
Property Rights in Human Tissues
The competing property interests of the DNA donor and clone are best understood
in light of the property law governing renewable and nonrenewable body parts.
Recognition of some type of property right in human organs is important for
advancing the clone's interest in his or her own organs. Likewise, in order for the
DNA donor to have any claim over the organs of the clone, the DNA donor must first
have a property interest in his or her own DNA. Absent such a property interest, there
76. See id. at 23-25.
77. Id. at 32.
78. Id. at 37-39.
79. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 26; see also XENOTRANSPLANTATION, supra note
69, at 33-34 (discussing things to look for in determining physiological compatibility).
80. NBAC REPORT, supra note 13, at 26.
81. KOLATA, supra note 12, at 9.
82. Id.
83. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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would be no justification for any type of claim over the clone's organs.
This section discusses the general law governing property interests in
nonrenewable and renewable body parts. Subpart L.a. examines some leading cases
dealing with nonrenewable body parts. In addition, Subpart L.b. addresses the
implication of a property interest in human organs as derived from the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act' ("UAGA") and the National Organ Transplantation Act85
("NOTA"). Subpart 2 then turns to property interests in renewable body parts,
including anal6gies to pre-zygotes and sperm.86
1. Property Interests in Genetic Material
and Nonrenewable Body Parts
a. Moore v. Regents of the University of California"
In order for a tissue donor to be able to claim a property right in a cloned organ
created from his or her DNA, he or she must first have a property interest in the DNA
or tissues used. In Moore, the California Supreme Court addressed this issue. The
plaintiff, John Moore, brought a cause of action for conversion when his physician
(and others) used cells taken from his spleen for medical research without his
permission." While hd was being treated for hairy-cell leukemia, doctors discovered
that some of Moore's blood products were very valuable, both scientifically and
commercially.89 Relying on his physician's recommendations, Moore agreed to have
his spleen removed.9' His doctors took additional blood and tissue samples on
subsequent visits and used these samples to establish a cell line that they subsequently
patented.9V ' The estimated worth of the patent was over three billion dollars.'
Although the court determined Moore had a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty,93 the court declined to find a cause of action for conversion.' To bring an action
for conversion, Moore had to "establish an actual interference with his ownership or
right ofpossession";95 he had to have retained ownership of his cells after they had
84. UNIF. ANATOMICALGFrACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993 & Supp. 2001) [hereinafter
1987 UAGA]; UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT (1968), 8A U.L.A. 94 (1993 & Supp. 2001)
[hereinafter 1968 UAGA].
85.42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74(1) (1994) [hereinafter NOTA].
86. See infra Part 11I.A.2.
87. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
88. Id. at 480.
89. Id. at 481.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 481-82.
92. Id. at 482.
93. The court determined that a physician must "disclose personal interests unrelated to
the patient's health" and obtain the patient's informed consent before proceeding with a
medical procedure from which the physician himself may benefit. Id. at 485.
94. Id. at 493.
95. Id. at 488 (quoting Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 824,
833 (Ct. App. 1981)) (emphasis in original).
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been removed. Since he had no reasonable expectation of maintaining possession or
ownership after their removal, he could not show a cause of action for conversion. 6
Part of the court's rationale for this decision rested on the conclusion that the cell line
the doctors patented and derived from Moore's tissues was "factually and legally
distinct" from the cells they took from Moore,97 and was more the product of the
work done by the researchers than the raw materials (cells) taken from Moore. In
addition, the court stressed the importantpolicy consideration ofprotecting scientific
inquiry. If researchers had to worry about the source of their raw biological materials,
they would be less likely to invest in beneficial research.9"
Although the court did not find a property interest in the cells after their removal
from the body, the court's language, stating that "Moore clearly did not expect to
retain possession of his cells following their removal, [and] to sue for their
conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them,"' does not foreclose
the possibility that if a patient reasonably expected to maintain control over his cells
or tissues upon removal, a property interest may still be recognized. The opinions of
Justices Broussard and Mosk pointed out this possibility. In the dissenting portion of
his opinion, Justice Broussard pointed out that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
"recognizes that it is the donor of the body part, rather than the hospital or physician
who receives the part, who has the authority to designate, within the parameters of the
statutorily authorized uses, the particular use to which the part may be put." " Justice
Broussard went on to note that this concept of "donor control" is not limited to the
context of deceased donors, but also is common in the transplantation context.'
Likewise, in his dissent, Justice Mosk indicated that a person may retain a property
interest in the use of his tissues following their removal."° Thus, if a tissue donor
specifies the use of the tissue before it is removed, he or she may retain some sort of
property interest in the resulting product, even if there is no property interest where
the person has no expectation of maintaining any sort of control over the excised
tissue." 3
The court in Cornelio v. Stamford Hospital" followed a similar line of reasoning.
In Cornelio, the plaintiff sued on a theory of replevin to recover pap smear specimen
slides that contained her genetic material,'015 claiming in part that she never indicated
an intent to relinquish possession." 6 The defendant claimed that patients had no
96. Id. at 489. The court also concluded that there was no case law supporting Moore's
claim of ownership, and that California law on the disposal of body tissues limited any interest
Moore might have had in his cells. Id.
97. Id. at 492.
98. Id. at 494-95.
99. Id. at 488-89.
100. Id. at 501-02 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also 1987 UAGA, supra
note 84; 1968 UAGA, supra note 84.
101. Moore, 793 P.2d at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
102. Id. at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
103. For a more thorough discussion of Moore, see Wagner, supra note 6, at 935-43.
104. 1997 WL 430619 (Conn. Super. July 21, 1997), aft'd, 717 A.2d 140 (1998).
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id. at *4.
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property interest in such slides, and therefore had no right to possession.'0 7 The court,
following the reasoning of the Moore court, declined to find a property interest in the
plaintiffs removed genetic material.' The court noted that the plaintiff could not
show "an actual interference with ownership or right of possession."'" In addition,
the plaintiff signed a release form that the court interpreted as an indication that she
did not expect to maintain control of her cells upon removal."0
At first glance, these two cases seem to indicate that a person does not have a
property interest inhis or her excised cells or tissues. However, based on the rationale
behind the holdings, this interpretation is not necessarily the case if the patient can
show an expectation of maintaining ownership upon removal. This scenario could
have implications for those who have tissue removed for the purpose of cloning an
organ."'
b. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and
the National Organ Transplantation Act
In addition to case law, the UAGA" 12 and the NOTA"3 also shed some light on the
status of property interests in nonrenewable body parts. The 1968 UAGA authorizes
a person (or his or her close relatives) to give away any body part"" for
transplantation or research purposes."5 The UAGA sets out procedures for
donating," 6 and allows the donor to gift an organ to a specific individual recipient."'
The 1987 version of the UAGA prohibits the sale of body parts for transplant and
therapy, but does not prohibit their sale for other purposes, such as research." 8
Consequently, the UAGA does seem to recognize at least a partial property interest
in body parts. If there were not some form of property interest in the body, a person
would not be able to give body parts away or sell them for research.
NOTA, likewise, prohibits the sale of organs for transplantation." 9 However,
NOTA only addresses the disposition of organs. Consequently, it is silent on whether
or not a property interest should continue for nonorgan body tissues. So, although
107. Id.
108. Id. at *7.
109. Id.
110. Id. The form stated: "This request form is intended to include the right to administer
drugs, anesthesia or blood transfusions and do all things necessary preliminary to; during or
after such procedure, including the right to dispose of all tissue." Id.
I 11. See infra Part III.D.
112. 1968 UAGA, supra note 84.
113. NOTA, supra note 85.
114. 1968 UAGA, supra note 84, § 2.
115. Id. § 3.
116. Id. § 4.
117. Id. § 5.
118. See 1987 UAGA, supra note 84, § 10.
119. NOTA, supra note 85, § 274e(a). The Act states "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." Id.
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there does seem to be at least a limited property interest in body parts, that interest is
not absolute.
2. Property Interests in Renewable Body Parts
Although cases such as Moore and Cornelio indicate there may not be a property
interest in body tissues in certain circumstances, the same does not apply to
renewable body tissues and fluids, such as hair, blood, and sperm. Several cases
address this issue. In York v. Jones,' the court recognized a property interest for the
plaintiffs in a cryopreserved pre-zygote.' The plaintiffs, who had gone to the
defendant doctor for in vitro fertilization procedures, had signed an agreement
detailing their property interest in the pre-zygote."
A similar case, Hecht v. Superior Court,'" involved property rights in sperm. In
the decedent's will, he devised to his girlfriend, the plaintiff, fifteen vials of sperm
he had deposited in a sperm bank for her use should she decide to have children.'24
In his will, he clearly indicated his desire that the plaintiff use the sperm to have a
child." The court distinguished the case from Moore on the grounds that there was
clear evidence of the decedent's intent to retain control over the sperm upon its
deposit in the spermbank."' "[A] contract with the spermbank purports to evidence
decedent's intent and expectation that he would in fact retain control over the sperm
following its deposit."'27 In addition, the very fact that the court recognized the sperm
as a part of the decedent's estate for probate purposes is further evidence that the
expectation a person has for the use of his or her tissues or fluids upon removal from
the body may be an important factor in determining whether he or she retains a
property interest in them.' So, taken together, these laws and cases seem to
recognize a limited property interest in body parts, or at a minimum, leave open that
possibility.
B. A Brief Overview of the Patent System
In addition to the potential protection ofproperty interests in humanbodyparts that
property law may afford, patent law also plays a role. Much research still needs to be
done before it is possible to clone individual organs in the laboratory. 9 The same is
120. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 424.
123. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
124. Id. at 276.
125. Id. at 277.
126. Id. at 280 n.4.
127. Id.
128. For a discussion on the history of property interests in the human body, see William
Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights
in Human Body Parts, 23 HoFsTRA L. REv. 693, 704-15 (1995).
129. See supra Part 11.A.3.
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true for the development of human organs in animals. 3 ' Research of this type is often
very expensive and time consuming. Consequently, there is a need for an incentive
system to encourage innovation that benefits society,' while allowing researchers
and inventors to get a return on their investment.132 The patent system, authorized
under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 3 3 sets up such an incentive
system. When determining who should have a property interest in cloned organs, it
is important to consider how a potential applicant's property interests interact with
the property interest of the person whose DNA the applicant used to create the cloned
organ. The conflict is even more apparent in cases like Moore, where the DNA used
to create the cloned organ or tissue may be important for research purposes.
1. General Requirements for Patent Protection
Patents are only available for certain kinds of inventions. The Patent Act describes
patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof .... ."'" In
addition to this utility requirement, to be patented, an invention must be novel,'35
nonobvious,'36 and capable of specification. 37 The present discussion will focus on
the patentability of living material. 3 '
130. See supra Part II.B.
131. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 50-52 (1998).
132. Patents grant, for a limited time, exclusive rights over eligible inventions foraperiod
of twenty years from the date of application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
133. "The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The patent laws promote
this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an incentive for their
inventiveness and research efforts." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
134. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
135. Id. § 102. In order to be novel, an invention cannot have been part of the prior art (in
the United States or a foreign country) "more than one year prior to the date of application for
patent." Id. § 102(b). In essence, if the invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or otherwise available for public use within this time, the invention is not
patentable for lack of novelty. Id. §§ 102(a)-(b).
136. Id. § 103. Section 103(a) states that no patent is available if"the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." Id. § 103(a).
137. Id. § 112. The specification should include:
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
138. Although there are still unresolved issues surrounding the other patentability
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2. Patentability of Living Things
The primary case dealing with the patentability of living things is Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.'39 In Chakrabarty, the respondent filed a patent application for a
genetically engineered bacterium capable of degrading oil, something which no
naturally occurring bacteria is known to do. 4° The patent examiner rejected the claim
on the grounds that "micro-organisms are 'products of nature,' and... as living
things they are not patentable subject matter."' 4' In affirming the reversal of this
decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,' the Supreme Court found
the bacterium to be patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.43
In its analysis, the Court construed § 101 of the Patent Act broadly.'" Although
the Court recognized some limitations on the scope of patentable subject matter,'45
the respondent's bacteriumnonetheless qualified as proper subject matterbecause the
claim was "not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally
occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity
'having a distinctive name, character [, and] use."" 46 The Court contrasted the present
case to that of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co."' The patentee in Funk
Bros. tried to patent a combination of naturally occurring bacteria. 4 ' The Court in
that case found no patentable subject matter because the bacteria did not act
requirements of cloned organisms, this Note will assume that those requirements can be met.
Other commentators have, however, addressed the issue of the patentability of cloned
organisms. For a discussion of some of the problems involved in patenting cloned organisms,
see Timothy G. Hofmeyer, Comment, Everybody's Got Something to Hide Except Me and My
Patented Monkey: Patentability of Cloned Organisms, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 971 (1998). Hofmeyer analyzes the patentability ofcloned organisms by analogizing cloned
organisms to patents that have been granted on transgenic animals. Id. at 980-93. For a
discussion on the new Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") utility guidelines and the
problems associated with granting broad patents over the human genome, see Kenneth Skilling,
Controversy Over Gene Patenting Persists, Despite Clarifying Guidelines, BNA PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY, June 13, 2000.
139.447 U.S. 303 (1980).
140. Id. at 305.
141. Id. at 306.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 318.
144. The Court cites legislative history stating a patent "may include anything under the
sun that is made by man." Id. at 309 n.6 (quoting Patent Law Codification and Revision:
Hearing on H.R. 3760 BeforS Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., 37 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico, Chief Examiner of Patent Office)).
145. "The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable." Id. at 309.
146. Id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,615 (1887)) (alteration
in original).




differently than it did in nature.1 49 In contrast, the Chakrabarty Court found the oil
degrading bacteria to have "markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and... the potential for significant utility."' 15
Subsequent case law, as well as policy statements by the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"), reinforces the decision in Chakrabarty. In Ex parte Allen,"'
although a patent claiming polyploid oysters was denied on other grounds, the Court
found the oysters to be nonnaturally occurring, indicating thatimulticellular organisms
may be proper subjects of patent protection." In addition, in 1987 the PTO issued
a statement declaring nonaturally occurring multicellular living organisms to be
patentable subject matter." Although the statement included animals as the proper
subject of patents, it explicitly excluded human beings." The decision in Allen and
the PTO statement reinforce the proposition that living organisms may be protected,
whether they are singular- or multicellular.
These developments set the stage for the later issuance of a number of patents on
living material. One of the most famous of these patents was for the Harvard
mouse.' The Harvard mouse is a transgenic mouse genetically engineered to exhibit
an increased susceptibility to cancer." In addition to patents issued on animals, the
PTO has also issued patents on individual genes."
The issuance of these patents raise the question that if living things and human
genes can be patented, how close to a "human being" must something be before
patent protection is denied? The PTO has denied patents for part animal, part human
creatures that could have been used in medical experiments.' The PTO has,
however, granted patents on transgenic animals that contain human genes and
organs.5 It would therefore seem logical that if scientists created an animal for use
in growing a cloned human organ, it might constitute patentable subject matter as
well.
149. Id. at 130.
150. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
151. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 1987).
152. Id. at 1427.
153. Donald J. Quigg, Animals-Patentability, 1077 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OFTIHE U.S. PAT.
&TRADEMARKOFF. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987). Patents have also been issued for transgenic animals.
See also Hofineyer, supra note 138, at 985 n.95.
154. Quigg, supra note 153.
155. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
156. Id.
157. See GRUBB, supra note 4, at 248.
158. Weiss, supra note 68, at Al. The Patent and Trademark Office issued a statement
saying that "inventions directed to human/non-human chimera could, under certain
circumstances, not be patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the
public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement." Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/officestcomspeeches/98-06.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 1998).
159. Weiss, supra note 158, at A2; see also infra notes 160-61.
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C. Property Interests in Organs Derived from Human Clones
As discussed in Part H.A.2, as the prospect of human cloning becomes more
feasible, people may turn to clones as a source of transplantable organs and tissues.
If this phenomenon occurs, a conflict may aise over who may claim a property
interest in the organs of the clone. While the prohibition on patents covering human
beings indicates that the scientist who created the clone could not obtain patent
protection over the organs,"6 the issue still remains whether the DNA donor should
have a property interest in the organs of the clone.
1. Interest of the DNA/Tissue Donor
The first question that must be asked is does the person whose DNA was used to
create the clone have a property interest in the clone's organs. Although the donor has
a definite interest in the clone by virtue of sharing the same DNA, it does not
necessarily follow that the donor should be allowed to control the clone's organs.
Although cases such as Moore and Cornelio did not find a continuing property
interest in cells excised from patients, they leave open the possibility that a person
may maintain some control over his or her own tissues if he or she has a reasonable
expectation of determining its use.' In the case of cells removed for the purposes of
creating a clone from which to obtain an organ for transplant, it would seem a fairly
simple matter to establish an expectation ofcontinuedpossession. Even assuming that
current property law does not foreclose the ownership of the excised cells and genetic
material, the question still remains whether courts should grant the DNA donor a
property interest in what eventually will be another person's organs.
Courts recognize property interests in renewable body parts where the person has
specified their use upon removal.6 2 In a sense, the DNA used to create a clone is like
renewable body parts; since every cell in the body contains DNA, there is always a
ready supply. Since it is the DNA that would be used to create a clone, a person must
have some kind of property interest in his or her own DNA before he or she could
claim an interest in the organs of a clone.
Some commentators assume people possess the DNA in their bodies because they
are the exclusive users of the information stored in the DNA." However, if DNA is
removed to create a cloned individual, the DNA donor is no longer in exclusive
possession of his or her genetic material-the clone now shares it as well.'" Although
typically a person could control the use of his orher DNA, "if the genetic information
encoded in one's cells is no longer in the sole possession of that person but can be
used by others, it cannot strictly be said that a right to exclude others from access to
genetic information accompanies possession of a DNA code."'65 In other words, by
160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
161. See supra Part III.A. l.a.
162. See supra Part I11.A.2.
163. Mona S. Amer, Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and Its Implications
for a Right to Individuality, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1667-68 (1996).
164. Id. at 1668.
165. Id. at 1668-69.
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virtue of creating the clone the DNA donor has relinquished some of the rights to
control the use of the DNA that normally would be available.
2. Property Interest of the Clone
Much ofthe same interests the DNA-donor has in his or her genetic material would
also apply to the clone. In fact, a clone should have a greater property interest in his
or her organs, since technically the clone would have "possession." There are several
additional reasons why the clone's interest in his or her body parts is superior to the
interest of the DNA donor. First, the Thirteenth Amendment, which would seem to
prohibit the DNA donor from claiming the clone's organs as his or her own, prohibits
a property interest in another person." Given the current debate over stem cells and
abortion, and the controversy over what constitutes life, it is unlikely that today's
public would consider a clone anything less than a person with the same rights as
everyone else. Consequently, to grant a property interest in the clone's organs to a
DNA donor would seem to violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
In addition, many of the same reasons put forth by those opposed to cloning weigh
in favor of the superiority of the clone's claim to his or her organs. One argument
offered in opposition to cloning in general is that it would invite discrimination. 67 As
the argument goes, people would make value judgments about the worth of the clone,
therebylessening the clone's dignity.68 Applyingthis argument to the clone's organs,
granting the DNA donor a property interest in the clone's organs would be
comparable to saying the clone had less worth or value as a human being than the
DNA donor does.
Others have advanced similar arguments with regard to the commercialization of
the human body. On one side of the argument, granting a property interest in body
parts would result in commodification of the humanbody, causing people to lose their
sense of identity. 69 This commodification would degrade the person and decrease
human dignity.' Applying this argument, not only the clone, but the DNA donor
would lose dignity if the donor were granted a property interest in the clone's organs.
The counterargument notes that since there is already a commercial interest in body
parts, recognition of a property right in the body would actually protect dignity by
helping a person control what happens to his or her own body parts.' This
counterargument provides strong support in favor of the clone's interest. If courts
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. This amendment is the basis for why human beings
are not patentable subject matter. See Quigg, supra note 153. There may also be Fourteenth
Amendment implications in such situations. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
167. Heimbach, supra note 13, at 638-39.
168. Id. It is also feared that the value and worth of the clone would be judged in relation
to the achievements of the DNA donor, and not on an independent basis. Okarma, supra note
68.
169. Brian G. Hannemann, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New Commodityfor the
1990s, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 399,423 (1993).
170. Carson Holloway, Monetary Incentives for Organ Donation: Practical and Ethical
Concerns, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION 143, at 152-54 (Bethany Spielman ed., 1996).
171. Boulier, supra note 128, at 719.
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recognize a property interest in te body, it follows that the clone would have a
superior interest to his or her organs than would the DNA donor."r Consequently,
advocates of cloning who list cloning as a potential source of organs for transplant
are not entirely accurate in their portrayal of the situation. The clone would have a
superior claim to his or her organs, even though the clone would have been created
using the genetic material of the DNA donor."
The situation of a body clone is slightly different. Although theoretically the
creation of a body clone may avoid some donor consent problems, there are practical
obstacles as well as moral and ethical problems with this approach. Setting aside the
moral and ethical implications of the creation of a body clone, a body clone may meet
the UAGA requirement of death, thus giving the next of kin the right to consent to
organ donation.174 In this situation, genetically speaking, the DNA donor would be
the clone's closest relative. In this respect, he or she could consent to the transplant,
and the issue of property interests in the clone's organs would be moot.
Although theoretically this approach may avoid some donor consent issues, there
are many practical problems with the use of body clones as a source of transplantable
organs-one such problemrevolves around the legal defimition of death. The creation
of body clones has been analogized to the case of anencephalic infants.'"
Anencephaly is a birth defect in which an infant is born with a brain stem, but lacks
a brain, skull, or scalp. 6 Anencephalic children typically do not live past a few years
after birth.'" Since they lack a cerebral cortex, they are incapable of conscious
thought, and are in a persistent vegetative state.' Since the brain stem of some
anencephalics may function, spontaneous breathing, movements, and heartbeat may
occur, although some doctors believe that anencephalics do not have the capacity to
suffer. 79 Since anencephalics lack a brain, but in many cases do have a functioning
brain stem, courts have debated whether or not they should be considered legally dead
for purposes of organ donation.
In In re TA.C.P., the Florida Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an
172. For a discussion of the argument advocating the recognition of property interests in
the human body and biological material, see generally Boulier, supra note 128; Amy S.
Pignatella Cain, Note, Property Rights in Human Biological Materials: Studies in Species
Reproduction and Biomedical Technology, 17 ARIz. I. INT'L & COMP. L. 449 (2000);
Hannemann, supra note 169, at 419-21; Wagner, supra note 6, at 933-35.
173. This can be compared to the situation of identical twins. Even though they share
identical DNA, no one has suggested that one twin may have a property interest in the body of
the other twin. See Amer, supra note 163, at 1682-84.
174. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 46.
176. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. 1992). To be diagnosed as anencephalic,
an infant must meet four criteria: 1. Missing a large portion of the skull; 2. Scalp is absent over
the skull defect; 3. Skull and scalp defects result in hemorrhagic, fibrotic tissue being exposed;
4. Recognizable cerebral hemispheres are absent. Id. at 590.
177. Id. at 590.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 591.
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anencephalic infant was legally dead for purposes of organ donation."0 Upon
learning that their child would be born with anencephaly, the parents of the child
T.A.C.P. agreed to carry the pregnancy to term, with the intention of donating
T.A.C.P.'s organs for use in transplant.'' However, T.A.C.P.'s health care providers
refused to declare her legally dead, thereby preventing her organs from being
harvested."8 2 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the lower court's refusal to declare
the child legally dead, applying a cardiopulmonary definition of death."' In doing so,
the court declined to create a new standard of death applicable to anencephalic
children. The court expressed concern about the suitability for transplant of organs
harvested from anencephalic children, stating "[w]e acknowledge the possibility that
some infants' lives might be saved by using organs from anencephalics who do not
meet the traditional definition of 'death' we reaffirm today. But weighted against this
is the utter lack of consensus, and the questions about the overall utility of such organ
donations."' "
This case illustrates a potential problem with the use of body clones as a source of
organs. What would happen with respect to organ donation consent if scientists
created a body clone that had a brain stein, or even a portion of a brain? Such a clone
may not meet the definition of death required for organ donation, especially in those
states that recognize a cardiopulmonary definition of death."' Another issue, also
raised by the court in In re T.A.C.P., relates to ethical concerns about personhood.
Treating a headless or brain dead clone as dead for purposes of organ donation is in
essence treating them as nonpersons."' This is harmful not only for the clone, but
may also be a slippery slope problem for other persons who lack cognition."8 7
D. Property Interests in Organs Cloned in a
Laboratory or Harvested from Animals
When organs are cloned in a laboratory, the interests of the DNA donor are much
the same as they were with regard to property interests in a human clone. With organs
cloned in a laboratory, there is no competing interest from a human clone. There are
also fewer moral and ethical problems involved in cloning in a laboratory."' Indeed,
the argument supporting recognition of a property interest in the human body to
protect dignity is even stronger in this situation. 89 The granting of a property interest
in body parts would help ensure the DNA donor had some control over how his or
180. Id. at 590-91.
18 I. Id. at 589.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 595. The court determined that because the child still exhibited
cardiopulmonary function, she was not legally dead under Florida law. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
186. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 595.
187. Id.
188. Even with respect to cloning embryos for their stem cells, it is thought this
controversial procedure would only be necessary for a short time. See West, supra note 66.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
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her genetic material was used, and ensure him or her access to the resulting organ.
The scientist who created the cloned organ may also have a competing property
interest in the form of a patent.'I" This scenario is very similar to that in the Moore
case, in which no property interest Was recognized in Moore's excised cells because
he could not reasonably expect to control their disposition.'9' In the present situation,
if the DNA donor were to specify the use of the DNA upon its removal from the
body, he or she should not be precluded from claiming a property interest in any
resulting organ or tissue. The contractual property rights afforded in cases involving
rights in renewable body parts would more closely govern this situation."
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the scientist or researcher who
creates the cloned organ or transgenic animal. At present, there is a strong
presumption favoring patentability of innovations, 93 including the patenting of
transgenic animals used for research, to improve food, etc.' The PTO has issued
patents on transgenic pigs created as a source of more compatible organs for
transplant."9 In addition to the current favorable climate for patents, the traditional
economic incentive arguments for granting patents apply as well. The limited
monopoly rights conferred by a patent encourage innovation by allowing the
researcher to recoup some of the investment spent in the development of the
product."g
Although patents are more likely to be granted for innovative techniques used to
create cloned organs or more compatible transgenic animal organs, 97 a case can still
be made for granting the researcher a property interest in cloned organs. However,
granting such a property interest is more appropriately applied to scenarios like that
in Moore, where the DNA used has valuable research aspects. In situations where an
organ is cloned in the laboratory from a person's DNA for the specific purpose of
transplanting that organ into the DNA donor, the donor's interest in the organ should
predominate.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the previous discussion indicates, advances in cloning and the biotechnology
field raise many interesting possibilities for organ procurement. Conflicting property
interests arise, however, as these possibilities come closer to reality. To resolve these
190. The same should be true when a person's DNA is cloned to create transgenic animals
for the purpose of harvesting more compatible organs. See infra note 195 and accompanying
text.
191. See supra Part III.A. 1.a.
192. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
193. Robert D. Kalinoski, The Role ofLay, in Our Technological World, 33 MD. B.J. 2
(2000), WL 33-AUG MD. B.J. *2, *6.
194. Eileen Morin, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH L.J.
147 (1997), available at LEXIS, 5 HEALTH L.J. 147, *176-78.
195. Id. at *178-79 n.205.
196. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
197. Robin Beck Skarstad, The European Union's Self-Defeating Policy: Patent
Harmonization and the Ban on Human Cloning, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 353, 382 (1999).
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conflicts, a person should have a property interest in body parts and DNA
relinquished for the purpose of cloning organs in a laboratory. The interest should
not, however, extend to an interest in the organs of a human clone, or to innovations
ofresearchers obtained through use of the DNA, ffthe donor agreed to have his DNA
used for such purposes. Limiting the property interest in this way offers some form
of protection to all the potentially interested parties.

